Bankers are regulated more than most business owners, giving them more incentive to arbitrage (avoid) regulation via loopholes. The supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) rule may present their latest arbitrage opportunity. Enacted after the crisis to prevent another leverage buildup, the rule caps leverage at the very largest U.S. banks. While the leverage rule is simpler than risk-based capital requirements because it requires equal capital against assets with unequal risk, bankers can arbitrage by shedding safer assets and/or adding riskier ones. An earlier leverage rule imposed in 1981 invited the same arbitrage, but there is little or no evidence that bankers exploited it. We find more compelling evidence of leverage rule arbitrage around the new rule. Studying difference-in-differences, we find higher risk (risk-weighted) asset shares and security yields at SLR banks relative to the control (the next largest set of banks) after the SLR was finalized in 2014. The effects tend to be larger at more leverage-rule-constrained banks, and some are substantial; mean yields at SLR banks rose (relatively) about 30 basis points. While this arbitrage might have, perversely, increased overall bank risk, we find no evidence that it did. Book and market risk measures were all essentially unchanged except one: leverage. The most constrained SLR banks significantly de-levered, commencing precisely when public disclosure of leverage ratios was required. Their reduced leverage may have offset the asset arbitrage, leaving overall risk unchanged.
Introduction
The déjà vu aspect of our question is reflected in the quotes above. The first is former Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker explaining why bank regulators were moving from the leverage rule imposed in 1981 to more risk-based capital rules. The second is the current Vice Chairman for Supervision explaining why the new leverage rule that took effect this year was being recalibrated to curb risk-shifting incentives. Even bankers have warned that the new leverage rule would provide temptation:
… the proposal would have discouraged banks from holding low-yielding, high-quality assets…in preference for riskier assets which would produce a higher relative return of capital. (J.P. Morgan (2014)) Despite these concerns, evidence of banks arbitraging the old leverage rule is scarce. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) predicted asset substitution and potentially higher overall bank risk but Furlong (1988) , the only test, found no evidence of either. That earlier rule was not well suited for testing, however, as all U.S. banks were covered and the limit was rarely binding. The SLR, to our advantage, covers only the very largest U.S. banks and strictly binds some.
We re-visit the arbitrage conjecture using difference-in-difference analysis applied to the latest leverage rule experiment. Our treated group comprises the 15 bank holding companies ("banks") covered by the SLR, the designated "advanced approach" firms that use internally generated risk estimates for setting risk-based (weighted) capital requirements. It was regulators' doubt about those estimates that motivated the leverage rule as a "simple, back stop" (BCBS 2009 ) immune to "model risk" at advanced approach firms. 2 Advance approach firms are very 2 large; at least $250 billion in total assets or $10 billion in foreign exposures. Our control group comprises the set of the next largest banks: the 18 other "systemically important" (Dodd Frank 2010) banks with assets under $250 billion but over $50 billion.
The two sets of banks faced similar (though not identical) post-crisis reforms apart from the SLR rule, so any differential risk change can, given sufficient controls, be attributed to the SLR rule. An important exception to this "principle" that all systemically important banks faced the same regulatory change after the crisis, apart from the leverage rule, is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) rule that requires covered banks to hold a sufficient share of "high quality liquid assets" on their books to cover a month of outflows (illiquidity). High quality assets are likely safer assets, so a binding liquidity rule could limit banks from arbitraging a binding leverage rule constraint. That limit might be irrelevant (a fixed effect) were all systemically important banks equally affected by the constraint, but in fact, banks subject to the leverage rule face a stricter liquidity rule. That poses identification problems. Our regressions include a proxy for liquidity limits to leverage arbitrage created by the LCR, but if the proxy is worse for SLR banks, as we suspect, the SLR effect we estimate will be understated. 3 We study risk at three levels: portfolio, security yields, and overall bank. At the portfolio level we study risky (risk-weighted) asset shares for broad asset categories: securities, trading assets, and loans. That analysis relies on the very risk weights that are in question for advanced approach firms, so potentially subject to the same doubts.
Our next level analysis eliminates such concerns by studying (market-based) security yields. For that we accessed individual security holdings from confidential bank filings used for stress-testing, then matched with yields, when available, from multiple sources. Aggregate bank security holdings and their ex post returns are public, but individual holdings and ex ante yields, a better measure of intended risk taking, are not. Our unusually detailed data, spanning about 75,000 unique securities and 1.1 million bank-security-quarters, lets us test for leverage arbitrage via "reach for yield" directly at the book and bank-security level.
The figure below anticipates a main result; mean weighted (by volume) security yields at SLR banks were substantially lower than that at non-SLR banks but they decline in tandem until the leverage rule was finalized in 2014:Q3. Afterwards, yields at non-SLR banks leveled off while yields at SLR reversed trend and began rising, nearly reaching the level at non-SLR banks.
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Our diff-in-diff estimates, conditional on bank size, risk-based capital, liquidity rule exposure, and standard fixed effects, confirm that visual SLR effect.
Mean security yields of SLR and Non-SLR banks. See corresponding figure at end for details.
Our granular securities data also lets us drill down to the security-bank level to examine holdings of the same security by different banks over time. That has similar identification advantages as the firm-bank analysis in Khwaja and Mian (2008) , except here it controls for security supply. Abbassi et al (2018) use security-bank level data to test for window dressing, a different type of regulatory arbitrage. We use the data to distinguish between the passive arbitrage described by Volcker (1987) , where banks merely shed safe, low-yield assets, versus the active version in Quarles (2018), where they add risker assets. Banks arbitrage regulation to different degrees and many do not arbitrage at all (Boyson et al. 2018) , so whether they actively arbitrage the SLR is of interest. As an act of commission, active arbitrage may reveal something about banker culture, which has also been questioned since the crisis.
We look lastly at measures of overall bank risk. Although we predict risk shifting around the leverage rule, the effect on overall risk is ambiguous because banks constrained by the rule must also de-leverage. That was largely the insight from the theoretical literature spurred by the 1980s leverage ratio cited above and more recently by Acosta Smith et al. (2017) , whose model embeds important regulatory changes since the 1980s (e.g. risk-based and leverage capital 4 requirements). The overall risk measures we examine, book and market, capture changes in asset risk and leverage.
Our portfolio-level findings are largely consistent with the risk-shifting conjecture. We find a sizable shift toward riskier securities and trading assets at SLR banks, but not, as expected, for loans. We also find a larger (relative) increase-about 30 basis points-in the average yield on securities held by covered banks and a larger increase for the more constrained SLR banks.
Despite the evident reach for yield, we find no increase in the battery of overall bank risk measures we examine (Z scores, CDS spreads, equity volatility, and others), not even for the most SLR-constrained banks. That apparent conflict is resolved by the fact that leverage ratios at the most constrained SLR banks have risen notably in relative and absolute terms. The additional capital offset the riskier assets, leaving overall bank risk unchanged.
Our findings extend recent studies of leverage rule arbitrage in the securities repo (repurchase) market (Allahrakha et al. (2016) , Bicu et al. (2017) , Kotidis and Van Horen (2018) , and Bucalossi and Scalia (2016)). The first three studies find evidence of banks reducing repo activity in response to leverage regulation in the U.S. or the U.K. 4 Our findings of more active arbitrage at the wider portfolio and bank level complements and extends those studies. Acosta Smith et al. (2017) also look beyond repo. They find a similar shift to riskier assets at European banks but no increase in overall bank risk, consistent with our findings. Our "reach for yield" findings are also consistent with evidence of insurance firms arbitraging (bond) ratings based capital regulations by shifting to higher yield securities within rating categories.
Our findings contribute to the broader literature on regulatory arbitrage, notably Calomiris and Mason (2004 ), Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013 ), Becker and Ivashina (2015 Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016), and Santos and Plosser (2014) . The latter find evidence of banks arbitraging risk-based capital requirements thus substantiating the doubts that motivated the supplementary leverage rule as a back stop. Our findings and the related repo market evidence suggests that the leverage rule solution may not have worked as intended.
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Section II reviews the history of leverage limits in the U.S. from the first in 1981 to the latest. Section III describes our empirical strategy. Section IV presents our data and results.
Section V concludes.
II. From Leverage Limits and Back Again
We trace the circle of capital regulation over the last 40 years from leverage limits to risk-based capital rules, then back, partly, to leverage limits.
Concerned about rising failures and falling capital levels across the banking system, U.S.
bank regulators announced explicit, uniform capital requirements for the first time in 1981
(Volcker 1987). 5 The rules required at least 5.5 percent primary capital and 6 percent total capital relative to total, on balance sheet assets. While the requirements were conditional on capital quality, they were invariant to asset quality (risk), hence were leverage limits in our terms.
The new rules triggered an active debate whether, theoretically, risk-invariant capital requirements, i.e. leverage rules, might actually increase bank risk via asset shifting (Koehn and Santomero (1980) , Kim and Santomero (1988) , Furlong and Keeley (1989) , where the denominator includes both on-balance sheet assets and many off-balance sheet exposures. The risk-invariant aspect of the SLR is obvious; two banks with the same total assets (on-and off-balance sheet) face the same limit, even if one has much riskier assets than the 7 other. By contrast, under the risk-based capital (RBC) requirement, the capital ratio is defined
where assets are classified into risk classes with different associated risk weights for each. If two banks have the same total assets, but one has more assets in the riskier classes, its minimum required capital will be higher.
It was widely reported that the new leverage limits were the binding capital constraint for Banks bound by the SLR limit have two options: increase tier 1 capital or decrease the total leverage exposures. If a bank chooses to raise more (costly) capital, one way to offset the increased costs is by shedding safer, lower-yielding assets (passive arbitrage) and/or adding riskier, higher-yielding ones (active arbitrage). If it instead chooses to reduce its assets, the least costly way to do so would be by shedding assets with low yields, such as reserves. In both cases, the bank's share of risky assets relative to safe assets, and its average yield on assets, should rise.
III. Empirical Strategy
We test for risk shifting by SLR banks using difference-in-difference (DD) regressions:
8 is one of several risk measures for bank i at t (described below). The firm fixed effect ( ) controls for constant risk differences across banks while the year-quarter fixed effect ( ) controls for time-varying aggregate factors (macro, financial, or monetary) that might affect bank risk.
equals 1 for banks subject to the rule and 0 for control banks, the 18, next-tolargest banks with assets between $50 and $250 billion. Including smaller banks in the control group would increase statistical power but would admit confounding effects from lighter treatment of non-systemically important banks, e.g. CCAR stress tests. 8 We opted for a cleaner test over a larger sample.
Since the SLR treatment (i.e. coverage) is by bank size or foreign exposures only, not bank risk profiles, we take this assignment as exogenous. As mentioned above, we limit our sample to very largest banks (i.e., "SIFIs") in an attempt to isolate any size-related confounding effects. There still may be pre-treatment risk differences between SLR banks and the control banks; however, these should be differenced out as long as the parallel trends assumption is met, so that our DD estimate captures the treatment effect. In secondary tests we investigate whether relatively more constrained SLR banks are more affected than less constrained SLR banks and non-SLR banks. Such a finding provides more casual evidence but "SLR tightness" may be less exogenous.
The indicator equals 0 through 2014:Q3 and 1 after. The rule was finalized in September 2014 after much back and forth between bankers and regulators over the denominator of the leverage ratio and, in particular, which assets would be included. Bankers clearly knew the SLR treatment was coming before then but did not know how they would be treated-how constraining it would be-until after.
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The SLR*post coefficient equals the difference-in-difference (DD) in . The riskshifting hypothesis implies > 0.
−1 denotes three bank-specific control variables, all lagged by one quarter. First is log(assets); controlling for size is standard in bank research but size may matter more here since the SLR banks are substantially larger than the control banks. Second is each bank's risk-based capital (RBC) ratio; shifting toward riskier assets to arbitrage the SLR would increase banks' risk-weighted assets and, given capital, reduce their RBC ratio so banks with higher RBC ratios will have more leverage arbitrage opportunities. Third is a proxy for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) rule at each bank. As discussed earlier, the stricter liquidity rule SLR banks face could limit their leverage arbitrage opportunities more than the less strict rule facing the control group.
That differential liquidity rule treatment could bias our SLR effect estimates downward. We cannot include banks liquidity ratio directly as banks were not required to disclose it until 2017 so we include a proxy: the (inverse) of the liquidity stress ratio calculated by Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
10 While the assumptions and calculation underlying the proxy are intended to match the LCR, they do not fully capture the stricter rule SLR banks face so any remaining bias is likely downward.
IV. Data and Findings
We study the portfolio risk measures (risk-weighted asset shares and securities yields), followed by the overall risk measures. We first examine trends in each outcome to check for pre-treatment differences, and then report unconditional and DDs per model (1).
a. Risk-Weighted Assets Shares
Risk-weighted assets are reported by bank holding companies in their quarterly reports to bank regulators (FR Y-9C, Schedule HC-R Part II). Reporting standards changed in 2015:Q1, when banks commenced reporting risk-weighted assets according to Basel III definitions. To ensure a consistent series, we adjusted the risk weightings after 2015:Q1 to approximate those before (see Appendix for details). As a precaution, we report results using adjusted and unadjusted weightings; our results are similar for both. The liquidity adjustments reflect the estimated liquidity ("run") risk of each liability type or off-balance sheet exposure (Choi and Zhou 2016). The proxy may overestimate actual LCR slack for SLR banks because the outflow adjustments used for the LSR do not fully capture the stricter LCR outflow assumptions SLR banks. Table 1 reports sample statistics for risk-weighted (RW) asset shares, the ratio of total RW assets to total assets, for the SLR banks and non-SLR banks both pre-treatment (2011:Q1-2014:Q2) and post-treatment (2014:Q3-2016:Q2). 11 We look at RW assets overall, and by broad asset class: securities, trading assets, and loans. 12 We expect any risk shifting to be more apparent for securities and trading assets as they are typically more liquid and thus easier to adjust than loans. 13 The unconditional difference-in-difference (DD), reported in Column 5, is positive and significant for RW total assets, securities, and trading assets. The unconditional DD for loans, by contrast, is much smaller and insignificant. Those patterns are evident in adjusted and unadjusted data.
To check for parallel, pre-treatment trends, we plot the difference (SLR -non-SLR) in the mean of each outcome over the sample period in Figure 2 . The constant difference for loans throughout implies parallel trends before and after the treatment. The differences for total assets and securities are essentially constant until the treatment date, when both begin increasing. The difference for trading assets is rising slowly pre-treatment but that increases sharply after. Table 2 reports the conditional DD estimates of model (1). Using the adjusted risk weights (Panel A), the DD for total assets and loans are positive but insignificant. By contrast, the estimates for securities and trading assets are positive and significant at the ten percent level.
Both estimates are sizable relative to the standard deviation in each variable; about one half of a standard deviation for securities and one third for trading assets. The estimates using the unadjusted risk weights in Panel B differ somewhat; the DD is 3.14 for total assets and 5.42 for securities, both significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate for trading assets is positive but smaller and insignificant with unadjusted data. Overall, we see some evidence of risk-shifting but where the shift registers (which asset class) depends on the weighting. The estimate for securities, however, is consistent (significance and size) regardless.
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Although we view the SLR vs non-SLR comparison above as a more exogenous treatment assignment, we also estimated a version of (1) that allows the SLR effect to vary by the relative "tightness" of the SLR limit:
where ℎ equals 1 for SLR banks with leverage slack (distance from the minimum requirement) at 2013:Q4 below the median for all SLR banks and 0 otherwise. is defined conversely. 1 and 2 measure the DD the dependent variable for each subset of SLR banks relative to the non-SLR control group. We predict 1 > 2 ≥ 0.
The results are reported in Table 3 . Contrary to expectations, the estimates for securities are essentially equal. The results for total assets, however, are as predicted; the SLR tighter estimate is around 5.5 (significant at one to five percent), versus 1.3 or less for SLR looser.
b. Reaching for Yield?
This section studies whether the apparent shift toward riskier securities above corresponds to higher yields. Our unique data on securities yields enables us to test the "reach for yield" conjecture directly and is also immune to doubts about the risk-weights underlying the previous tests. Mean weighted average yields ("yields" henceforth) for the various subsamples, (winsorized at the 1 and 99 th percentile) are reported in Table 4 . 17 The mean overall was on the order of two percent, reflecting the low interest rate environment banks were operating in over the sample. Yields at SLR bank were lower in both periods, but the gap narrowed posttreatment.
The trends shown in Figure 3 tell the same story; yields moved in parallel until 2014, when yields at SLR banks began converging toward non-SLR bank levels.
The DD estimates in Table 5 The regression for this analysis adds a subscript for security s and includes a triple difference term indicating high yield securities:
The dependent variable ℎ is the log of holdings of security s by bank i holdings at time t, × is a bank-security fixed effect, and × is a bank-quarter fixed effect.
and are defined as before. As in Abbassi et al. (2018), ℎ equals one if the yield on s at t was in the top quartile of all yields that quarter. High yield "status" can change frequently by this definition so we test if SLR banks are actively reaching for (relatively) yield every quarter. As holdings and yields are measured at quarters' end, we alternatively use ℎ −1 indicating yield status the quarter before holdings are measured. Allowing for slightly delayed or reactive pursuit of yield may actually be more plausible. Passive arbitrage is sufficient to explain the findings thus far so our null hypothesis of "passive only" implies β = 0.
Passive and active arbitrage implies β > 0.
This security-bank-quarter level regression should account for multiple potential correlations among the regressors and error term. First, there could exist serial correlation within securities as holding of a certain security is persistent over time, and cross-sectional correlation for the same security across banks due to the marked-to-market valuation changes that affect all banks holding a certain security. Second, within bank correlation could exist across securities due to a common shock within banks. Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we attempt to control the second dimension by including × fixed effects, denoted by ( × ).
We also include × fixed effects, denoted by ( × ), to account for different holdings of the same security across banks. We then capture the first dimension by clustering standard errors at the security level.
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We plot normalized (to 2014:Q2) mean holdings of high-yield securities in Figure 5 . Riskier holdings measured at this level fluctuate much more than the risky asset shares at the portfolio level in Figure 2 . That variation helps with identification but obscures the trend comparison somewhat; they seem essentially parallel until about treatment when SLR banks' high yield holdings rose above non-SLR bank levels. Table 6 reports OLS estimates of β. The estimates are positive and significant at the one percent level whether High Yield is defined relative to the current quarter distribution of yields (column 2) or the previous quarter's (thus allowing for "sluggish" portfolio adjustments; column 6). The estimate in column 2 implies holdings of high-yield securities by SLR banks increased 7.4 percent relative to non-SLR. The effect is significant even for the less constrained, SLR Looser banks (column 4) but is over three times larger for the SLR Tighter banks.
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Decomposing the crossed-fixed effects into separate security, bank, and time fixed effects yields qualitatively similar results (columns 1 and 3). Defining High Yield alternatively relative to the yields the quarter before holdings are measured accentuates the differences between SLR Tighter and SLR Looser (columns 7 and 8).
d. Did Leverage Rule Arbitrage (Perversely) Increase Overall Bank Risk?
Theoretically, the answer is ambiguous; while leverage-constrained banks may have tilted toward riskier assets due to the SLR, those banks were also less levered than they would have been without the constraint. In the Acosta Smith et al (2017) model, the latter effectgreater loss absorbency-dominates the risk shifting, so the leverage limit makes banks more stable on net.
20 Cameron and Miller (2015) note that multi-way clustering "relies on asymptotics that are in the number of clusters of the dimension with the fewest number of clusters. This method is thus most appropriate when each dimension has many clusters." They suggest "if you have multi-way clustering and few clusters… try to add sufficient control variables so as to minimize concerns about clustering in one of the ways, and then use a one-way few-clusters cluster robust approach on the other way." 21 A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal at the one percent level.
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This section tests how overall measures of bank risk changed at SLR banks. We study three book measures: ROA, ROA volatility, and Z scores; and four market measures: equity volatility, CDS spreads, implied volatility, and put option delta. The market measures and Z scores (an inverse risk measure) should reflect both asset risk and leverage. Sources and calculation of these variables are standard (see appendix for details).
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Summary statistics are reported in Table 7 . The unconditional DD are mixed, with significantly positive estimates for ROA, ROA volatility, and CDS spreads and significantly negative estimates for Z scores and equity volatility.
The conditional DD reported in Table 8 
e. Did Forced Deleveraging Offset Leverage Rule Arbitrage?
If SLR banks sidestepped the rule by tilting toward riskier assets, why did overall risk not rise? Perhaps because banks strictly constrained by the rule that choose not to shrink assets also had to increase capital. Figure 6 shows that the trend in (inverse) leverage at the most constrained SLR-banks paralleled the trend at less constrained SLR banks and non-SLR banks until 2015 when more constrained SLR banks when SLR banks (inverse) deleveraging markedly.
The shift commenced in 2015:Q1, after our SLR treatment, but coinciding precisely with the disclosure "treatment;" when banks were required to disclosing their supplementary leverage ratios to investors and the public.
In table 9, we report summary statistics and unconditional differences in the leverage ratio. SLR banks have lower leverage ratios on average, and both types of banks increased 22 The book risk measures (ROA, ROA volatility, and Z score) are calculated from banks' Y-9C reports. Equity volatility equals the quarterly standard deviation of the log of daily difference in stock price. Implied volatilities (on a 50% out-of-the-money option that expires in 1 year) for each entity-quarter are pulled from Bloomberg; together with Treasury rates data from FRED these are also used to calculate implied deltas using the Black-Scholes formula. Banks' 5-year CDS spreads are from Markit.
leverage ratios over the sample period. However, as the unconditional difference-in-difference in column 5 indicates, SLR banks relatively increased their leverage ratio post-treatment by a sizable margin, around 62 basis points. This is also supported in Table 10 , which presents the results of our formal model including controls and fixed effects. The coefficient in column 1 is positive and statistically and economically significant at around 83 basis points. As expected, and as indicated by the trends in Figure 5 , the estimate is larger (around twice as large) for more constrained SLR banks. A Wald test rejects the hypothesis (at the 10% level) that the two coefficients are equal. Thus, our evidence suggests that SLR banks "de-levered" in response to the rule, perhaps offsetting the risk-shifting effects on the asset side described above. Of course, it is also possible that the general post-crisis regulatory environment induced higher capital at these banks coincidentally.
V. Conclusion
Leverage rules are supposed to limit bank risk but could increase it if banks sidestep the rule by shifting to riskier assets. Though as old as leverage limits themselves, that conjecture is relatively untested as previous U.S. leverage rules applied universally to all banks and were rarely binding. The SLR requirement, by contrast, applies only to the very largest U.S. banks and is tightly binding for some, affording an opportunity to revisit that question.
Our evidence is consistent with the risk-shifting conjecture but not the perverse consequences. Banks subject to the new rule, particularly those most bound by it, appear to have rebalanced their portfolios toward riskier (self-reported) assets overall. Consistent with that finding and reaching-for-yield concerns, we also find a substantial rise in yields on securities held by the covered banks and a larger yield increase at the most constrained banks. Overall bank risk measures, book or market, have not increased, not even at the most constrained banks, suggesting that the higher capital required under the new rule offsets the effect from the shift to riskier assets, or vice-versa.
On the policy front, our findings suggest that regulators' concerns that the new leverage rule was distorting banks' portfolio decisions in unintended, undesirable ways were not unjustified.
They also suggest that the recent modifications to the rule to make it more risk-sensitive and supplementary, as originally intended, will reduce risk shifting without increasing overall bank risk. Note: The weighted average yield is calculated in two steps. First, for each bank-quarter, within each asset class we calculate the value-weighted average yield, i.e. weighted by the market value of each security in the class. We then weight the weighted average yield for each class by the value share the asset class represents within the bank-quarter in the overall Y-14 data. See Appendix for details. Vertical line at treatment date (2014:Q3). Note: Reported are OLS estimates of δ from model (1) using panel data on all banks with at least $50 billion in assets over 2011:Q1 to 2016:Q2. Robust, clustered (by bank) standard errors are in parenthesis. Post indicates post-SLR treatment (2014:Q3); SLR indicates treated banks (firms with at least $250 billion in assets or over $10 billion in foreign exposures). The regression model includes log assets, the risk-based capital ratio, and a proxy for the liquidity coverage rule exposure (all lagged one quarter) and fixed effects (bank and year-quarter). Dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. (2) using panel data on all banks with at least $50 billion in assets over 2011:Q1 to 2016:Q2. Robust, clustered (by bank) standard errors are in parenthesis. Post indicates post-SLR treatment (2014:Q3); SLR indicates treated banks (firms with at least $250 billion in assets or over $10 billion in foreign exposures). SLR Tighter indicates that the SLR was below median in 2013:Q4; SLR Looser is above median. The regression model includes log assets, the risk-based capital ratio, and a proxy for the liquidity coverage rule exposure (all lagged one quarter) and fixed effects (bank and yearquarter). Dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Note: Reported in column (1) are OLS estimates of δ from model (1) using panel data on all banks with at least $50 billion in assets over 2011:Q3 to 2016:Q2. Reported in column (2) are OLS estimates of β 1 and β 2 from model (2) using the same panel. Robust, clustered (by bank) standard errors are in parenthesis. Post indicates post-SLR treatment (2014:Q3); SLR indicates treated banks (firms with at least $250 billion in assets or over $10 billion in foreign exposures). SLR Tighter indicates that the SLR was below median in 2013:Q4; SLR Looser is above median. The weighted average yield is calculated by first obtaining (for each asset class) the average yield weighted by the amount of the bank's holding in that class. Then the overall average is obtained by weighting by the amount of holdings in each asset class in the original Y-14Q. The regression model includes log assets, the risk-based capital ratio, and a proxy for the liquidity coverage rule exposure (all lagged one quarter) and fixed effects (bank and year-quarter). Dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. . SLR Tighter indicates that the SLR was below median in 2013:Q4; SLR Looser is above median. "High Yield" is an indicator for whether the security is in the fourth quartile of yields of the current quarter or the previous quarter. The regression model includes log assets, the risk-based capital ratio, and a proxy for the liquidity coverage rule exposure (all lagged one quarter) and fixed effects (different sets depending on the specification). Dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Note: Equity volatility equals the quarterly standard deviation of the log difference in daily stock price for public firms. Implied volatilites are on a 50% out-of-the-money option that expires in 1 year. Implied deltas are calculated using the Black-Scholes formula. Leverage ratio equals tier 1 capital divided by total assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. SLR indicates treated banks (firms with at least $250 billion in assets or over $10 billion in foreign exposures). SLR Tighter indicates that the SLR was below median in 2013:Q4; SLR Looser is above median. The regression model includes log assets, the risk-based capital ratio, and a proxy for the liquidity coverage rule exposure (all lagged one quarter) and fixed effects (bank and year-quarter). Dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * , * * , and * * * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
A3: Constructing Average Securities Yield
Calculating the weighted average yield by combining all asset types may skew the average yield due to differences in asset class composition between our matched sample and the full Y-14 data. To mitigate this concern, we construct the weighted average yield in a two-step process. First, for each bank-quarter, within each asset class we calculate the value-weighted average yield, i.e. weighted by the market value of each security in the class. We then weight the weighted average yield for each class by the value share the asset class represents within the bank-quarter in the overall Y-14 data.
For example, suppose a bank's securities portfolio in a given quarter, as reported in the Y-14, is composed of 10% corporate bonds and 90% Treasuries by value. Suppose the valueweighted average yield of corporate bonds in our sample is 4% and that of Treasuries is 2%. Then our final yield would be:
(0.1 × 4%) + (0.9 × 2%) = 2.2%.
The following notation formalizes this calculation. For each security s, asset class c, bank b, and quarter t, we first calculate the sum:
where r is the security's yield and v is the ratio of the security's market value to the total market value of asset class c. Thus, w is the value-weighted average yield for each asset class c. Then, we calculate the sum:
where k is the share of the bank's portfolio belonging to class c as reported in the Y-14. Thus, y bt is our final bank-quarter weighted average yield observation.
